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A B S T R A C T
A fast automated biometric solution has been proposed to satisfy the future border control
needs of airports resulting from the rapid growth in the number of passengers worldwide.
Automated border control (ABC) systems handle the problems caused by this growth, such as
congestion at electronic gates (e-gates) or delays in the planned arrival schedules. Different
modalities, such as face,fingerprint, or iris recognition,will be used inmost of theABC systems
located at airports in the European/Schengen areas. Because facial recognition is the modal-
ity that travelers considermost acceptable, it was decided to include thismodality in all second
generation passports. Face recognition systems, installed in small kiosks inside the e-gates,
require high quality facial images to allow high performance and efficiency.Accurate face rec-
ognition algorithms,which should be invariant to non-idealities, such as changes in pose and
expression, occlusions, and changes in lighting, are also required for these systems. In this
paper, a review of the most important face recognition algorithms described in the literature
that are invariant to these non-idealities and that can be used in ABC e-gates is presented. A
comparative analysis of the most common ABC e-gates located at the different airports is
provided. In addition, the results of an experimental evaluation of a face recognition system
when halogen, white LEDs, near infra-red, or fluorescence illumination was used, which was
conducted in order to determine which type of illumination is optimal for use inABC e-gates,
are presented. To conclude, improvements that could be implemented in the near future in
ABC face recognition systems are described.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
Eurocontrol (2013) has proposed different scenarios for pre-
dicting the number of flights in the coming years. According
to the most likely scenario (named regulated growth), by 2035
the number of flights will have increased by 40%. Busier air-
ports, a higher number of missed flights because of low capacity,
an increase in the average distance per journey, delays in ar-
rivals and departures, and a higher traffic flow are some of the
predicted consequences of this continuous increase in flights.
It is necessary to appropriately plan airport expansions and
elaborate certain regulations that take third country nation-
als (TCNs) into account. Characteristics, such as economic,
political, and social conditions, and the level of technological
development must be carefully considered so that the effects
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mentioned above can bemitigated. In order to meet this growth
in passenger flow and air traffic, automated border control (ABC)
systems have been installed at different worldwide airport
entries and exits with the aim of facilitating travel while main-
taining the security of international border crossing points. In
an effort to work toward this harmonization, several practice
guidelines have been published by different organizations, such
as Frontex (technical and operational) (Frontex, 2012a), Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO, 2015), the
International Air Transport Association (IATA, 2016), and the
European Committee for Standardization (CEN, 2015).Their ob-
jective is to create a definitive guide to ABC specifications and
design based on human–computer interaction and safety
aspects. Biometric characteristics have been used in border con-
trols for more than 100 years, from the time when a photo of
the passenger was first included in the passport. However, the
automation of the identification process could be realized only
when the biometric technology became sufficiently mature to
reach a satisfactory performance and accuracy level. The first
attempt to introduce a biometric-based ABC was made in 1992
at the Amsterdam Schiphol airport, when a fingerprint bio-
metric system, the Schiphol Travel Pass, was introduced. Since
then, a growing number of countries have introduced ABC
systems at their airports.
1.1. The Schengen area and third country nationals
(TCNs)
The growing number of countries using these systems in-
cludes those in the Schengen area and third countries. The
Schengen area countries include all EU member states except
the United Kingdom and Ireland, which obtained an opt-out
clause while being included in certain aspects of the inter-
governmental co-operation based on the Schengen Agreement.
The Schengen area also includes four countries that are not
members of the EU: Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and Liech-
tenstein, and three microstates, Monaco, San Marino, and the
Vatican, which are de facto parts of the Schengen area, as they
do not have border crossing controls with the surrounding
Schengen countries. As of 2014, 28 countries, presented on the
map in Fig. 1 in which the Member States are also listed, are
included in the Schengen area. After the Treaty of Amster-
dam was signed, the Schengen Agreement was incorporated
in the EU framework; thereby, countries joining the EU will also
become part of the Schengen area. One of the main aims of
harmonization is to facilitate the travel of TCNs. A TCN is any
person who is not an EU citizen within the meaning of Article
20(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(European Commission, 2008) and who is not a person enjoy-
ing the EU right to freedom of movement, as defined in Article
2(5) of the Schengen Borders Code. Several projects, such as
the Automated Border Control for EU project (ABC4EU) project
and the Smart Borders Package, have invested considerable
effort in integrated border management (IBM), in particular for
TCNs. For this integration, an entry/exit system (EES) was pro-
posed using an electronic registry of the dates and places of
entry and exit of each TCN admitted for a short stay. In addi-
tion, a registered traveler program (RTP) was suggested for pre-
vetted, frequentTCN travelers in order to allow facilitated border
crossings. On the one hand, an RTP is a registration program
that allows traveling TCNs to enter the EU using simple or
complex borders control systems, such as ABC systems. On the
other hand, an EES registers the times and places of the TCN
entries/exits to/from the EU, respectively. As a result, three leg-
islative proposals were tabled by the European Commission,
the Proposal for a Registered Traveller Programme, the Pro-
posal for an Entry–Exit System, and the Proposal for an
Amendment of the Schengen Borders Code, in order to meet
the future challenges that the EU has been actively facing
because of IBM. Registered travelers will enjoy the same right
to free movement as EU citizens.
1.2. Automated border control e-gates and different
topologies
This paper is focused on biometric face recognition systems
that can be or currently are implemented inABC electronic gates
(e-gates). In order to offer to the reader a comprehensive review
of this topic, the ABC (Frontex, 2012a) is defined and its dif-
ferent topologies are described in the following.AnABC (Frontex,
2012a) is a fully automated system that performs border checks.
The basic functions of the system are to authenticate the travel
document, establish that the traveler is the rightful holder of
the document, query border control records, and on this basis,
automatically verify the entry conditions for Schengen area citi-
zens and TCNs. An ABC component is the e-gate consisting of
the following main components: (a) an electronic passport
reader, (b) biometric readers, (c) an electric door opened by elec-
tronic means, and (d) a device to display visual instructions,
which guide the passenger through the border control.An e-gate
may be also called anABC-gate.The operation of anABC system
can involve one or two physical barriers (e-gates), which may
have swinging or sliding doors. To read the traveler docu-
ment and capture the facial image, a document reader and
several biometric capture devices are used, respectively. Moni-
tors, LEDs, signals, and audio devices are integrated in the user
interface. Processing units and the network devices allow the
system to be connected with the database central station.
During the last few years,ABC e-gates have been located world-
wide. Some of these were initially a part of pilot projects to
test the capability of these systems and to improve the border
crossing processes while maintaining high security levels. Cur-
rently, most are fully operational deployments, designed to
facilitate the border crossing process. According to IATA, there
are now numerous airports in the world with automated border
controls. In Fig. 2, a map provided by IATA shows the location
of these airports. Some are equipped to work with ABC
machine-readable travel documents, in others, ABC pre-
registration is required, and still others have both characteristics.
Most ABC systems use unimodal biometric systems for access
control and operate in two phases: enrollment and authenti-
cation. During the enrollment phase, the user’s biometric
elements are acquired using a biometric reader and stored as
a labeled template in a database. During the authentication
phase the biometric patterns are captured for identification and
verification of the user’s identity. For identification (1:N), the
pattern is compared with all the users’ templates in the da-
tabase and for verification (1:1) the comparison is performed
only with the templates corresponding to the claimed iden-
tity. A more detail description of these processes is given in
50 c om pu t e r s & s e cu r i t y 6 2 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 4 9 – 7 2
Section 1.4.The topologies and physical designs of current ABC
e-gate systems vary. They may comprise different step pro-
cesses, such as single-step, integrated, or segregated two-
step processes, and be integrated in a mantrap, constituting
a single or double e-gate. Each topology is affected by differ-
ent external factors, such as lighting or humidity, and this
should be taken into account during the design of facial rec-
ognition systems. In fact, biometric systems should be invariant
to these factors. In the case of one-step processes, only one
step is needed to verify traveler’s identity and satisfy the docu-
ment security checks. No registration or enrollment is required
in this process and the verification is performed at the same
time as the authentication. If a mantrap design is used, pass-
port validation and facial recognition are performed
simultaneously within the mantrap to reduce passage time
through the gates. If the information does not match, the trav-
eler is referred to an immigration officer who performs a
traditional manual check. In the case of integrated two-step
processes, the security document checks and the traveler’s veri-
fication are performed in separate steps, usually in a mantrap
e-gate. Here, the verification takes place after the document
authentication only if the authentication is successful. Con-
versely, the segregated two-step process is the same as the
integrated two-step process, but involves different physical
structures. Usually in the first stage, the traveler’s document
is verified; the facial image is captured as biometric informa-
tion and the fingerprint is used as a token for the registration
or enrollment. In the second stage, the token is checked and
Fig. 1 – Shengen area countries: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Sweden, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Switzerland. The three microstates, Monaco, San Marino, and the Vatican,
are also included.
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the traveler crosses the border. In some airports, such as Barajas
and El Prat International Airports, a multimodal system is used.
In the case where a face modality verification falls in an un-
certainty score zone between the lower and upper thresholds,
travelers are required to present their fingerprints for addi-
tional verification (Cantarero et al., 2013). If the identification
remains unverified, then a border guard directs the traveler to
a manual check.
1.3. Travel documents
Travel documents are one of the main factors in the border
crossing process.Travelers need them for identification and veri-
fication purposes in the ABC e-gates. However, there is no
unified or standardized travel document that can be used at
all borders worldwide or even in only the EU.They can be clas-
sified as electronic passports (e-passports) (ICAO, 2006a),
Schengen visas (ICAO, 2015; Visa, 2007–2016), national ID cards
(BSI, 2011; ICAO, 2011), and residence permits (BSI, 2011). ICAO
(2014a) has already defined the characteristics of the e-reader.
In addition to the Schengen acquis, the Council Regulation 2252/
2004 of December 13 2004 calls for the use of the document
bearers facial image and two fingerprints in interoperable
formats (Article 1). Member states were instructed to apply the
regulations stipulations for facial images within 18 months and
fingerprints within 36 months (Article 6).This regulation states
that biometrics information is to be used only to verify docu-
ment authenticity and the identity of the holder (Article 4), and
for no other purpose. Because the most common travel docu-
ments used in ABC systems are e-passports, a classification
and description of the types used in the different Schengen
countries and TCN borders is given in the following. An
e-passport can be defined as an identification document with
an embedded radio frequency identification (RFID) chip, which
contains significant biographic and biometric information of
the e-passport holder. Depending on the travelers category,
which in the near future will be checked in either the RTP or
EES (PWC, 2014), and the security authentication protocols, dif-
ferent e-passports are used by travelers of different nationalities.
EU member states have been responsible for issuing
biometrically enabled passports to their citizens since August
2006, as per the EU Councils December 2004 regulation No. 2252/
2004 (Council of the European Union, 2004).The first generation
e-passport, which features only one biometric modality, i.e.,
the facial marker, is now broadly available. The second gen-
eration e-passport featuring two biometric modalities has been
in circulation since June 2009. Standard ICAO compliant second
generation passports of ID-3 size are defined in ICAO Docu-
ment 9303, part one (ICAO, 2006a, 2006b).This specification also
holds for TCNs. For e-passports of Schengen member states,
the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) specification
TR-03110, parts 1 and 3 (BSI, 2012, 2013) are also applicable for
the definition of Extended Access Control (EAC). Future third
generation passports will have a new security mechanism,
Supplemental Access Control (SAC), as specified in ICAO (2010).
This comprises an evolution of the Basic Access Control (BAC)
and protects the contactless chip in the same manner as the
data exchange between the chip and the reading device, which
is encrypted.The new SAC is planned to gradually replace the
BAC because of the higher degree of security it provides. The
use of a six-digit password with the name of the Card Access
Number (CAN) is also allowed by SAC, with the aim of access-
ing the data stored on the cards RFID chip. The CAN, which is
typically printed on the document, may therefore replace the
machine-readable zone (MRZ) as a prerequisite for reading data
from the chip. The migration from second to third generation
passports has recently begun in some airports. BAC will still
be supported for global interoperability and backward com-
patibility reasons and the two security mechanisms, BAC and
SAC, will coexist for some time (Gemalto, 2011).
Fig. 2 – Airports with an ABC system (white symbol: ABC machine-readable travel document required; brown symbol: ABC
pre-registration required; star symbol: ABC pre-registration and ABC machine-readable travel document required).
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1.4. Enrollment and verification processes
Because the enrollment and identification processes consti-
tute critical parameters at ABC e-gates, this section is focused
on describing both processes. Their efficiency and perfor-
mance must both be high level; however, it is difficult improve
both simultaneously, because the minimization of the enroll-
ment and verification times usually demands an increase in
the system performance. Enrollment is the process that
comprises all the required actions to grant access or obtain
documents, which are mandatory for specific categories of
travelers, in order to cross a border. It applies to an RTP and
the Visa Information System (VIS) (European Commission,
2016). Enrollment of registered travelers in an RTP is similar
to that in the VIS. Therefore, future enrollment processes will
be inherited from the existing VIS enrollment process. Enroll-
ment consists of four sub-processes: receipt of an application,
collecting biometric data, examining the application, and
issuing the travel document. Traveler identification is the
process that comprises a set of activities that result in the
validation of the traveler identity. It consists of three sub-
processes: biometric capture, biometric data consultation,
and biometric verification. In the biometric capture sub-
process, the required biometric features of the traveler are
captured live at the location. Currently, these features depend
on each Border Authoritys requirements. Biometric data con-
sultation is the sub-process in which the encrypted biometric
data queried from the enrollment biometric database are
decrypted into usable information for biometric verification.
This sub-process is executed only when the border authori-
ties require additional biometric data in addition to the data
stored in the traveler’s passport. If the border authority
requires additional biometric data, the system can decrypt
the biometric information from the enrollment to match
with the biometric information in the travelers document. In
the biometric verification sub-process, it is verified that a
traveler who is at the border control point (BCP) is the same
as the person whose biometric data are stored in the docu-
ment (e-passport or corresponding document) or queried in
the central biometric database. The system matches the
biometric data captured previously with the biometric data
in the document to verify that they belong to the same
citizen. If some irregularity occurs, the border authorities can
reject the traveler and prohibit him/her to cross the border.
The logs resulting from the biometric verification sub-
process are saved in a searchable repository. Individual checking
can be performed and in some cases this determines whether
this sub-process is one of the different checks required to
verify that the traveler can cross the border.
1.5. International Civil Aviation Organization
requirements for automated boarder control e-gates that
operate with second generation passports
As reported at the beginning of this introductory section, several
organizations, such as ICAO, IATA, and CEN, are responsible for
the passenger flow control and its automatization using dif-
ferent systems, such as ABC e-gates, at BCPs. More specifically,
the ICAO suggests several recommendations for ABC systems
regarding face image characteristics, performance, and effi-
ciency. These recommendations, in particular for second
generation passports, which are the most common and secure
travel documents available in the Schengen area, are de-
scribed in this section.
1.5.1. Facial image characteristics
Regarding facial images, the ABC e-gates biometric image
ICAO requirements for second generation passports are very
specific and determined by the requirements concerning the
travel documents’ security and size. They should follow the
ISO/IEC 19794-5 constraints for facial images (ISO/IEC, 2004).
The operational and technical recommendations required to
meet these constraints should be followed by travelers during
the photo capture (ICAO, 2010) process; for example, regard-
ing operational issues they should look straight into the
camera keeping a neutral pose with both eyes visible; regard-
ing technical issues, the parameters of the camera should
ensure the provision of face images within a broad range of
contrasts; there should be at least 90 pixels between the
centers of the eyes in facial images provided by the face
image capture unit (Frontex, 2010); the face image capture
unit should give the traveler feedback on his/her expected
action; the angle covered by the cameras should be less than
45 degrees with respect to the traveler walk flow; the cameras
resolution should be of at least 2 megapixels, and they
should have short fields of view and frame rates of at least of
10 frames per second; image formats used, such as BMP,
JPEG, JPEG 2000, and PNG, should have a storage compression
of 24 bits/pixel, and, based on resolution, in face images
there should be at least 90 pixels between the centers of the
eyes. Another recommendation is to set a standard for tem-
plate usage of biometric features instead of images. As the
ICAO prescribed in Document 9303, the JPEG or JPEG2000
image within e-documents should have a size of 12 K (in
practice, in the range 15–20 kb). The current ICAO-standard
for machine-readable documents includes a facial image of
300 dpi resolution compressed with JPEG or JPEG2000 to a
typical size of 12–20 kb. Again, the standard is based on
physical and practical constraints (e.g., available storage and
the baud rate of the contactless chip) and on experiments
conducted using face recognition software. Furthermore, it is
recommended that a quality assessment of the captured
images be performed so that the good quality of the images
provided for the verification process is ensured. The quality
assessment should cover at least the face and eye region.
ISO/IEC 19794-5 (ISO/IEC, 2004) gives guidelines for image
quality analysis. Additionally, quality assessment may be
useful for test and evaluation purposes.
1.5.2. Performance and efficiency
Following best practical technical guidelines for ABC systems,
the false accept rate (FAR) for facial capture and verification
should be less than 0.1% and using this configuration the false
rejection rate (FRR) should be less than 5% (CEN, 2015; Frontex,
2012a; ICAO, 2014b). As stated above, these recommenda-
tions suggest several constraints regarding the face image
quality required at ABC e-gates when second generation pass-
ports are used (Sánchez del Rio et al., 2015). These constraints
are in the scenery and in the photographic and digital require-
ments (Frontex, 2010; ISO/IEC, 2004). To ensure the efficiency
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of the process, a standard time for normal cases or a longer
time for travelers with disabilities to pass through the e-gates
should be established. In normal situations, the time for cross-
ing the mantrap, from the time the traveler places the passport
on the reader until he/she exits the ABC system, should not
exceed 30 s.This time is the sum of the times required for the
electronic and optical checks, the image capture process (the
period of time between the frames being recorded by the
cameras and their storage in the templates), and the match
of the captured image with the electronic images. An inter-
esting study on performance and efficiency in possible
hypothetical smart border scenarios may be read in PWC (2014).
The best practices toward interoperable biometrics stan-
dards can be read in two important sources, the ICAO (ICAO,
2014b) and the Frontex Research and Development Unit
(Frontex, 2012a). Besides the aforementioned organizations, the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is also
contributing to interoperable standards in the use of biomet-
ric information (Romine, 2013).
1.6. Examples of automated border control systems at
third country national airports
Before reviewing the potential ABC facial recognition systems
described in the literature, some examples of ABC e-gate
check procedures performed at some of the TCN airports
(Seoul, Vancouver, USA, Hong-Kong, Brazil, and the United
Arab Emirates (UAE)) are described below. In this paper, we
define a TCN airport as one located in a third country,
meaning a country the citizens (nationals) of which are not
EU citizens: they do not enjoy the EU right to freedom of
movement, as defined in Article 2(5) of the Schengen Borders
Code. As a result, TCN ABC systems are the ABC systems
used in the TCN countries. The authors consider this section
important for the reader, because a general idea about the
working process of some of the most important TCN ABC
systems is needed to gain a general understanding of current
ABC system state of the art. For this purpose, the guidelines
followed by Schengen area travelers and TCNs with their
corresponding RTP when crossing a BCP are first explained
and then a general view of the TCN ABC systems working
process is described. If implemented, the RTP would allow
full automation of the border checks for registered travelers
(RTs). It would operate at the border as follows. A registered
(i.e., pre-screened and pre-vetted) traveler will be issued a
token in the form of a machine-readable card containing
only a unique identifier (i.e., an application number), which
is swiped on arrival and departure at the border using an
automated gate. The gate will read the token and the travel
document (and visa sticker number, if applicable) and the
fingerprints of the traveler, which will be compared to those
stored in the central repository and other databases, includ-
ing the VIS for visa holders. If all checks are successful, the
traveler will be able to pass through the automated gate. If
any issue arises, the traveler will be assisted by a border
guard. When the ABC system is used by a TCN, the system
should display the allowed duration of stay to the traveler
and to the border guard officer. If the traveler has exceeded
the allowed stay, the system should also display a warning to
the border guard officer. In addition, the ICAO-compliant
standard for second generation passports of ID-3 size defined
in ICAO Document 9303 part one (ICAO, 2006a, 2006b) also
holds for TCNs. Examples of TCN airports with ABC systems
are now presented. At Incheon International Airport serving
Seoul, South Korea, passengers using their e-passports can
take advantage of a fully automated system; when depart-
ing, they can proceed from airport check-in to self-boarding
and when arriving, complete an ABC procedure, with no
contact with border officers. In Vancouver, a form of ABC,
where eligible passport holders can clear customs faster, has
already been implemented. A visual inspection of the pass-
port by a border officer is still required, since the process is
not fully automated. At US airports, there are several differ-
ent types and models of automated border check gate, which
are usually operated under different RTPs. However, the ABC
kiosks at Miami International Airport, called Passport Express
Kiosks, are not part of any set RTP, but may be used by any
US or Canadian citizen carrying an e-passport. In order to
use the ABC gates in the US, a person must be registered,
pre-vetted, and screened in order to prove to the government
that he/she is a trustworthy citizen. At Hong-Kong’s airport,
the ABC gates are known as e-Channels. An e-Channel is an
integrated two-step system, using fingerprints as the biomet-
ric identifier means; pre-enrollment is required.The biometric
verification process is presented in pictures and writing and
a video is available, guiding the viewer through the process.
The manner in which the immigration officers will assist the
traveler in the case of a malfunction is also presented at the
e-Channel. Brazil is one of the most significant countries in
terms of increased traveler flow to the Schengen area. There-
fore, it is of interest and importance to launch new technology
in this area. In this case, the gates are available for people
over the age of 18 years with Brazilian e-passports. In the
UAE, the border control system is comprehensively managed
in accordance with strict pre-qualification and visa issuing
processes. Border control forms a key aspect of controlling
the various ports of entry and exit throughout the UAE. The
Information Technology Department at Abu Dhabi Police
GHQ found that biometric feature verification would be an
effective method to prevent illegal immigrants or any un-
wanted passengers entering the country.
1.7. European Union projects focused on harmonization
of the automated border control e-gates
To conclude this introduction to ABC and face recognition
systems, several European projects (Berglund and Karbauskaite,
2008) related to ABC e-gates, funded by the EU and with the
aim of achieving harmonization of the current and near
future growing traveler flow, are now described. Most of
these involve EU passport model biometric data with the
objectives of preventing the illegal entry of travelers into a
specific country, limiting the use of fraudulent documents,
and making the border control more efficient (Kosmerlj et al.,
2006). FastPass is one of the Seventh Framework Programme
(FP7) projects. This project is designed to establish and dem-
onstrate a harmonized, modular approach for ABC gates
(FastPass, 2016). Another FP7 project is the ABC4EU project
(ABC4EU, 2014), the primary aim of which is to make border
control more flexible by enhancing the workflow and harmo-
54 c om pu t e r s & s e cu r i t y 6 2 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 4 9 – 7 2
nizing the functionalities of ABC e-gates. It involves the
utilization of the ABC systems operational features, paying
special attention to second generation passports. One goal of
this project is to adapt the e-gates and mechanical reader
traveler documents (e-MRTDs) to the TCN. An RTP and EES
will be tested to assess their feasibility and an EU level
border management command, control, communication, and
computing intelligence (C4I) concept will be developed for
the end-user. A project that is still active today is Automatic
Recognition of Passengers with Credentials (RAPID) (Frontex,
2010), which was launched by the Portuguese authorities to
facilitate the increasing flow of passengers at airports, enhance
their service levels (speed and convenience), save personnel
resources, and reduce costs. The RAPID system is based on
facial recognition and allows the automated border crossing
of passengers holding EU/European Economic Area (EEA)
e-passports. The European Agency for the Operational Man-
agement of Large-scale Information Technology Systems in
the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (EU-LISA) (Eu-LISA,
2016) was founded in 2011 through Regulation (EU) No.
1077/2011. One of its objectives is to provide a long-term
solution for the large-scale management of operational infor-
mation technology (IT) systems that are necessary for the
implementation of EU border migration policies.These systems,
such as the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Visa
Information System (VIS), and EURODAC (Council of the
European Union, 2000), assure travelers’ protection and the
exchange of information between national authorities. Differ-
ent biometric tests at air, sea, and land borders are performed
by this agency under the Smart Borders package.This package
comprises a European record of TCN entries and departures,
containing biometric data and an RTP, also for TCNs, which
enables them to use automatic borders, in the Portuguese
case at RAPID electronic borders. The goals of Smart Borders
are to speed up border crossing, enhance travelers experi-
ence at the border, and eliminate manual passport stamping,
thus providing border guards more time to focus on passen-
gers rights and duties, facilitating the acquisition of information
on over-stayers, and fighting irregular immigration.
1.8. Objectives of this work
A review of the face recognition systems described in the lit-
erature with the aim of determining which can be used in ABC
e-gates is presented.Many of the face recognition systems were
designed such that they should be unaffected by external
factors, such as changes in lighting, pose, occlusions, or dif-
ferent face expressions. These factors are often called system
non-idealities.A review of several face recognition systems pre-
sented in the literature that are invariant to non-idealities, a
quality that is strongly required by ABC e-gate systems, is pro-
vided. Because ABC systems with high performance and
efficiency are needed to maintain the level of security recom-
mended by different authorities and organizations, such as the
ICAO, Frontex, or IATA, in these types of scenarios, this review
examines the methods presented in the literature for achiev-
ing face recognition systems having high efficiency and
performance levels that can be integrated in ABC e-gates at
BCPs. An experimental evaluation was performed of a face rec-
ognition system very similar to real ABC systems, including
halogen and fluorescence lamps and white LEDs and near infra-
red (NIR) for homogeneous illumination. The main objective
of this experiment was to determine the best illumination
system, so that a novel system can be designed for use in ABC
systems that is able to control non-idealities, such as changes
in illumination. Then, a comparative analysis of ABC systems
in terms of maturity, applicability, acceptance, performance,
cost, constraints, and deployment was performed.This evalu-
ation was conducted according to the real requirements of
current ABC systems and covers the studies in the literature
related to this topic. To conclude, some improvements in ABC
face recognition systems that can be integrated in the near
future ABC e-gates are presented. One of main contributions
of this paper is that the state-of-the-art face recognition
methods applied in ABC e-gates are described, providing a
general insight into face recognition systems that satisfy the
most relevant characteristics that should be applied in ABC
e-gates. Algorithms that mitigate non-idealities are pre-
sented and the provided evaluation of several face recognition
systems chosen according to the characteristics that need to
be integrated in ABC systems will allow the reader to gain an
idea about the current situation of ABC systems worldwide.The
analysis presented here determines whether sufficient studies
that are applicable to ABC systems exist or whether, on the
contrary,more research focused onABC systems should be con-
ducted. The paper is organized as follows. A study of face
recognition techniques focused on ABC e-gates is presented
in Section 2. The studies related to invariance to 2D face rec-
ognition system non-idealities are summarized in Section 3.
A comparative analysis comparing several ABC systems is de-
scribed in Section 4. An experimental evaluation of an ABC
e-gate face recognition system very similar to that used at
Barajas Airport is presented in Section 5. Improvements that
could be implemented in near future ABC face recognition
systems are presented in Section 6, and finally, conclusions are
given in Section 7.
2. Face recognition studies focused on
automated border control e-gates
Several studies reported in literature, which are considered to
be relevant to the design of a high efficiency and perfor-
mance recognition system, are described below. Some are
related to the travelers’ documents check, others to the evalu-
ation of the extent to which the non-idealities in either
uncontrolled or controlled environments affect facial recog-
nition in ABC systems, and others are based on the manner
in which low image quality affects the traveler face match-
ing performance. Kosmerlj et al. (2006) conducted an experiment
to evaluate the operation of face recognition systems in large
scale applications. For this purpose, the author compared face
recognition system errors with those incurred when a human
supervisor attempted to detect false acceptances of the com-
puterized system. The sample used comprised Norwegian
citizens exhibiting different appearances, in particular differ-
ent hairstyles. It was concluded that automated identity
verification of a passport holder by using a face recognition
systemmay not give significant additional security in large scale
applications and another more secure modality, such as fin-
55c om pu t e r s & s e cu r i t y 6 2 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 4 9 – 7 2
gerprints, should be used instead of or in addition to the face
recognition system. Spreeuwers et al. (2012) evaluated the au-
tomated facial recognition reliability for automatic border
passage in two gates at Schiphol Airport. Image quality face
recognition accuracy was evaluated. Live images of every trav-
eler were compared to the digital photographs stored on their
passports. Different sets of images were used: a clean set, a
realistic set, a challenging set, and a last in series set.The clean
set was created using standard quality, and the images were
without blur, lighting, pose, or scan line problems. The realis-
tic set contained images with lighting and scan line problems.
The challenging set comprised blurred images and images with
faces with large pose variations, and the last in series set con-
tained three of a series of the same subject. A very good
performance was obtained, achieving a high verification rate
(VR) in each test set (clean, realistic, challenging, and last in
series sets) with the best algorithm: 97.1%, 98.1%, 97.5% and
99.2% and 99.7%, 99.6%, 98.6% and 98.5% for the first and second
gates, respectively. These results are very acceptable for au-
tomatic border passage gate operations (a VR above 99% for a
FAR of 0.1%, or even lower).Although not anABC system, Conde
et al. (2011) evaluated a general recognition system applied in
public access areas at Madrid-Barajas International Airport,
Spain.Three video surveillance cameras were selected: two in
corridor areas and one at a control point. Images with light-
ing changes, with several quality levels, of collaborative and
non-collaborative users, and compressed using four data com-
pression methods, 1DPCA, 2DPCA, 2DLDA, and coupled sub-
space analysis (CSA), were considered. An SVM was used for
classification purposes. It was concluded that CSA achieved the
best performance for the face images used and that the SVM
obtained excellent results given the difficult conditions of this
type of scenario. In Beom-seok and Kar-ann (2013), a tech-
nique for face feature extraction using sinusoidal projection
was used. Essentially, the technique uses a projection matrix,
which is formed by stacking vectors with sinusoidal values at
different frequencies, to directly multiply with a raw image
matrix for weighted feature extraction. Orthogonality among
vectors within the sinusoidal projection matrix is observed
when the frequencies are chosen as multiples of the funda-
mental frequency. The proposed technique is of interest for
application in ABC e-gates, because the study showed a prom-
ising verification performance for three different face databases.
Non-idealities, such as illumination, poses, expressions, and
occlusions, are avoided by using this type of system. In Hwang
et al. (2011), a face recognition system using the extended cur-
vature Gabor classifier bunch with the Face Recognition Grand
Challenge (FRGC) version 2.0, XM2VTS, BANCA, and PIE data-
bases was described. This method has a high application
potential in ABC e-gates because it extracts different fea-
tures with high accuracy. First, Gabor kernels are converted to
extended curvature Gabor (ECG) kernels, which leads to nu-
merous feature candidates. Then, single EGC classifiers are
separated and implemented applying linear discriminant analy-
sis (LDA) to the corresponding feature vector. Although a single
classifier is used like the ECG classifier bunch that combines
multiple ECG classifiers using the fusion scheme, high accu-
racy is obtained. The system presented here is invariant to
several non-idealities, such as illumination changes and
occlusions.
3. Non-idealities in automated border control
systems
As reported previously, several problems should be consid-
ered when designing and constructing an ABC system. These
problems are called the non-idealities of the system in this paper.
Some of these non-idealities are low quality images, non ICAO
compliant photography, inhomogeneous illumination, lack of
neutral expressions and poses, skin conditions, aging, inho-
mogeneous background and object occlusion, extreme
temperature and humidity, scalability problems, and non ICAO-
compliant performance and efficiency. The objective of
decreasing the number of non-idealities through the design
of the ABC systems hardware or software elements presents
a great challenge. In the case of hardware, components must
be located such that the appropriate ergonomics and correct
signalization for the traveler are achieved. The different com-
ponents that constitute the interaction with the traveler, namely,
the document reader, display, and biometric modules, must be
strategically located in the most ergonomic position, while still
assuring stable environmental lighting conditions. This is es-
sential for both maximizing the individual performance of each
component and speeding up the ABC process by making the
crucial steps more intuitive for travelers. Furthermore, the
correct location protects the module from vandalism and im-
proves fire protection in the case of hazardous environments.
The components should be grouped together, creating a stream-
line for the travelers interaction. Concerning software, several
studies exist in the literature, in most of which attempts were
made to improve performance and efficiency with fast and pow-
erful recognition algorithms. Databases with face images that
were captured in either an uncontrolled or controlled envi-
ronment, different poses and expressions, or low quality images,
such as damaged travelers passport photos, are often used for
training and testing in order to create a real scenario similar
to that present in an ABC system. A summary of face recog-
nition studies reported in the literature based on the solutions
to these non-idealities is presented in the next section.
3.1. Solutions to automated border control system non-
idealities: invariant 2D face recognition system models
As previously mentioned, ABC systems have to operate with
face recognition algorithms invariant to non-idealities, such
as changes in lighting, rotation, and pose (Zhang and Gao, 2009).
Most of these methods are described in the literature and a
review of some of them that are applicable for solving ABC
systems non-idealities is presented below.
3.1.1. Non-ideality of the difference in pose. Degradation
caused by image quality factors
Difference in pose is defined as the different possible posi-
tions of the face in front of the camera. In Duta et al. (2012),
the effects of a difference in pose between the test and refer-
ence images together with performance degradation caused
by image quality factors, such as illumination, resolution, noise,
blur, and Gaussian noise, were studied. In order to find a so-
lution to this problem, a high performance and robust face
recognition system (FaceVACS C++ SDK Version 8.4.0. devel-
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oped by Cognitec Systems GmbH) was tested with face images
of the MultiPIE database to determine the effect of different
poses and lighting.An open set recognition scenario was created
so that some variations in several test and reference image
quality factors, such as illumination, resolution, noise, blur, and
Gaussian noise, were introduced with the aim of determin-
ing the extent to which they affect the system performance.
Furthermore, it was proved that differences in general poses
between the test and reference images increased the perfor-
mance degradation caused by these image quality factors. In
order to calculate the system performance for the different
poses, a scheme involving the overall difference in the area
under the relative operating characteristic (ROC), called AUC,
for each of the quality parameters was used. It was con-
cluded that the system can reach a near optimal recognition
performance provided that the pose mismatch is small. This
study is interesting for those studying ABC systems because
of the similarity of this scenario with the real one in ABC
systems.
3.1.2. Non-ideality of different expressions
The non-ideality of different expressions, which is respon-
sible for lowering face recognition systems performance and
defined as different features obtained because of emotional
states, such as happiness, sadness, or concern, can be solved
by improving the feature extraction technique. In Er et al.
(2005), the discrete cosine transform (DCT) was used to
reduce the dimensionality of the original facial image. First,
low frequency DCT coefficients were discarded so that large
area lighting variations were alleviated. These truncated
coefficients were clustered. Then, Fishers linear discriminant
(FLD) was implemented with the aim of obtaining the most
invariant feature of human faces; thus, the original vectors
were linearly projected in a low-dimensional sub-space. The
training samples were then clustered and classification using
a radial base function (RBF) neural network was performed.
For this purpose, system structure was determined and the
RBF neural networks parameters were estimated. In the
study, this technique was applied to the ORL, FERET, and Yale
databases, and it was concluded that an enhanced system
performance with a low susceptibility to changes in lighting
was achieved. Another study that focused on the non-
ideality of expression was presented in Zhang et al. (2008). In
this study, a new method with a high performance under
different expression conditions was developed. Scale invari-
ant feature transform (SIFT) for features extraction and an
SVM for classification was used with the ORL and Yale face
databases.
3.1.3. Non-ideality of different illumination
A large number of studies were focused on the optimization
of functions that are invariant to the non-ideality of illumi-
nation change. Changes in illumination produce variations in
the face texture, color, feature extraction, etc., similar to the
differently illuminated face regions, degrade the perfor-
mance of the face recognition system. For example, in Chen
et al. (2000) a probability approach was proposed for analyti-
cally determining a probability distribution for the image
gradient, which is dependent on the surface geometry and re-
flectance. This distribution showed that the direction of the
image gradient was not affected by changes in lighting and this
was tested for face recognition. It was constructed from more
than 20 million samples of gradients in a database of 1280
images of 20 inanimate objects under different lighting con-
ditions. In addition, images of 10 faces, each under 45 different
lighting conditions, were used. Each face under frontal light-
ing was considered as the training image and the recognition
test was performed for the remaining 440 images. Four sub-
sets were obtained based on the lighting angle with respect
to the frontal or camera axis. Higher recognition accuracy than
when using other methods, such as correlation, eigenfaces,
linear sub-spaces, cones-attached, and cones-cast, for the sub-
sets and measures immune to light change for image
comparison was achieved. Furthermore, it was shown that for
objects with Lambertian reflectance, there are no discrimina-
tive functions of images that are invariant to lighting. Other
examples of this non-ideality were studied using the Harvard
face database in Belhumeur and Kriegman (1996). In this study,
the set of images of a convex object with a Lambertian reflec-
tance function, under all possible lighting conditions, is a
convex, polyhedral cone. It was proved that for convex objects
with Lambertian reflectance functions, the dimension of the
cone equals the number of distinct surface norms.The results
should be taken into account for any recognition system under
variable lighting.
3.1.4. Non-idealities of different expressions and illumination
To address the non-idealities of expression and lighting, a new
face verification system based on integral normalized gradi-
ent images (INGIs) was proposed by Hwang et al. (2011). In this
work, invariance in illumination and expression was ob-
tained with face images captured in uncontrolled environments
with lighting variations.The FRGC database, containing neutral
and smiling facial expressions, was used. The subject image
sets consisted of controlled still images (with two different light-
ing conditions and facial expressions), uncontrolled still images
(in which lighting conditions varied because of being taken out-
doors and in hallways), and 3D images. To solve this non-
ideality, multiple face models in three groups with different
between-eye distances within a regular face image region were
constructed, and thereby, three different classifiers were ob-
tained. A similarity score for each was calculated by a
normalized correlation. It was concluded that the use of this
lighting and expression invariant method improves the system
performance for this database. Figs. 3 and 4 summarize the
steps followed in this work and described above.They respec-
tively show the facial images preprocess and hybrid Fourier
based on principal component analysis (PCA) followed by linear
discriminant analysis (LDA) (PCLDA) schemes. In Fig. 3, the face
image is transformed into a light-insensitive image (INGI) by
normalizing and integrating the smoothed gradients of the facial
image.Then, the lighting invariant image is reconstructed and
fused with the original image in order to recover the informa-
tion that might have been lost because of the previous
processes. In Fig. 4, the three different Fourier feature domains,
that is, the real and imaginary component domain, Fourier spec-
trum domain, and phase angle domain, are presented. All the
Fourier features were independently projected into discrimi-
native sub-spaces by applying PCLDA theory.
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3.1.5. Non-ideality of age
An attempt to design a face recognition system invariant to
the non-ideality of age was presented in Li et al. (2011). In this
study, every face was represented with a patch-based local
feature representation scheme with the aim of solving the age
variation problem.Multi-feature discriminant analysis (MFDA),
with SIFT andmultiscale local binary patterns (MLBP), was used
to reduce the large feature vector dimensionality problem.The
face aging MORPH and FG-NET databases were used for this
purpose.
3.1.6. Non-ideality of a single sample per person
In the study presented in Hu et al. (2015), the non-ideality of
a single sample per person was solved using a face recogni-
tion method based on the lower upper (LU) decomposition
algorithm. For this purpose, first the single sample and its trans-
pose are decomposed into two sets of base images by using
an LU decomposition algorithm. Then, from these two basic
images, two approximation images are constructed by apply-
ing the reverse thinking approach. In order to evaluate the
optimal projection space (with a training set), the Fisher LDA
is then used. Finally, a nearest neighbor classifier based on Eu-
clidean distance is considered as the final classification. For
experiments and method evaluation, four public face data-
bases were employed: FERET, AR, ORL, and Yale B. The results
showed the best recognition rate, 81.50%, with the AR database.
3.1.7. Combined non-idealities
The effects of a mix of different non-idealities, such as orien-
tation, scale, facial expression, and occlusions, were described
by Lai et al. (2001). To reduce these non-ideality effects, a ho-
listic face representation, called spectroface, was used. In this
representation, the wavelet transform and the Fourier trans-
form are combined in order to obtain an invariant to translation,
Fig. 3 – Structure of an integral normalized gradient image (Hwang et al., 2011).
Fig. 4 – Structure of hybrid Fourier transform based on PCLDA (Hwang et al., 2011).
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scale, and on-the-plane rotation and a highly accurate and ef-
ficient face recognition system.TheYale and Olivetti databases,
which contain different orientations, scale, facial expres-
sions, small glasses/eyes, and different lightings, were used to
evaluate the proposed system. For improving recognition in sce-
narios where a combination of several non-idealities, such as
lighting, expressions, pose, scale, and occlusions, are present,
a method based on PCA, kernel principal component analy-
sis (KPCA), and LDA approaches was described in Wang and
Liu (2015). The aim of this study was to improve on the
covariance-based methods, such as PCA and KPCA. For this
purpose, an entropy matrix was proposed to load the uncer-
tainty information of random variables. Then, an entropy-
difference matrix was used as a weighting (EW) matrix for
transforming the original images. In this method, the infor-
mation provided by LDA and PCA is integrated as a new form
for extracting features. For experimental analysis, a nearest
neighbor classifier was employed, and two public databases
were considered: ORL and Yale. The images of some subjects
in the ORL database were captured at different times, with
varying lighting, facial expressions (open/closed eyes, smiling/
not smiling), and facial details (glasses/no glasses). Facial poses
changed to some extent. The Yale database, which includes
center-light, with glasses, happy, left-light, without glasses,
normal, right-light, sad, sleepy, surprised, and winking face
images, was used. A high recognition rate, 96%, was ob-
tained, outperforming individual methods such as KPCA. Non-
idealities, such as changes in uniform illumination and local
appearances changes, e.g., facial expression, pose, and occlu-
sion,were addressed in Chen et al. (2015).To resolve the problem
related to the single-structural feature extraction methods, a
new feature fusion strategy was proposed. A novel discrimi-
nant criterion function was established combining the Euclidean
and manifold structures of the facial images. A performance
superior to that of some single-structural feature extraction
approaches was obtained with publicly available face datasets,
such as ORL, FERET, and CMU PIE. Non-idealities, such as large
variations in pose, illumination condition, or expression, are
considered to limit the performance of variance-based or
distance-based methods. To examine this, an experiment in-
volving the recognition of participants in a conference was
conducted in Zhao et al. (2015) and its results are applicable
to conference socialization scenarios. It is an interesting study,
because its results can be easily extrapolated to ABC systems.
The steps in the method proposed in this study for perform-
ing face recognition are as follows. First, the local feature points
are automatically detected by the proposed framework. Second,
template matching is used to determine the important feature
regions of faces using different angles. This means that large
pose variations between training and test images are allowed.
Third, no specific distribution of the training data is required,
and thus, the system is flexible to various kinds of input data.
In this proposed framework, frontal images are used as train-
ing images, and verification is performed using any arbitrary
view of subject.The identity of a person can be recognized from
a picture taken from a standard mobile phone. Experiments
were conducted with the standard FERET database and two self-
collected datasets composed of images from real conference
socializing environments. The recognition accuracy rate
achieved was 86%, which is higher than that of other exist-
ing methods. In Kaur and Himanshi (2015), a method for facial
recognition based on PCA was proposed.The main aim of this
study was to investigate the effect of possible non-idealities,
such as excess of accuracy, strict time limitations, high pro-
cessing speed, and availability. Experiments were conducted
using the ORL and AR databases, and the best result was a
96.35% recognition rate. It was concluded that PCA is one of
the simplest and fastest recognition approaches.
3.1.8. Non-ideality of using only some of the face image color
cues
This non-ideality, in which only some colors are used for face
recognition, sometimes as a result of the hardware em-
ployed, was addressed in Xiang et al. (2015).The method in this
study was designed to improve the accuracy of color face rec-
ognition based on PCA. For this purpose, the color images
matrix-representation model, based on the framework of PCA
for color face recognition, is used with the GATech color face
database. In this study, the problem of color information omis-
sion when images are transformed into gray scale was resolved.
The recognition rate increased as compared to that obtained
with conventional PCA methods, and an average accuracy rate
of 80% was obtained.
3.2. Face databases
In this section, a review of the most common databases used
in different facial recognition studies to test their algorithms
performance and efficiency are presented. Multiple facial rec-
ognition algorithms have been developed to obtain high
recognition rates, high performance, and high accuracy, so that
they can be used in high security applications such as ABC
e-gates. A general facial recognition system evaluation bench-
mark framework does not exist and every public or private
agency system is evaluated using the private datasets of the
respective agency. This lack of standardization has motivated
many researchers to generate several face databases, which
provide as many variations as possible in their images (dif-
ferent lightings, poses, expressions, etc.) so that system
performance and efficiency analyses can cover situations in-
volving different environmental conditions.The most common
databases used for face recognition systems evaluation that
were reported in the literature are the following (Grgic and
Delac, 2005): AR, FERET, SCface, Multi-PIE, Yale face database,
Yale face database B, PIE, FIA, AT&T, Cohn-Kanade AU-Coded
Facial Expression Database, MIT-CBCL, Image Database of Facial
Actions and Expressions (Expression and Image database), Essex
University, NIST Mugshot, NLPR, M2VTS, XM2VTS, the Univer-
sity of Oulu Physicsbased Face Dataset, CAS-PEAL, JAFFE, BioID
HumanScanAG, PICS, UMIST,Max Plank, Caltech, EQUINOX HID,
VALID, UCD Colour, Georgia Tech Face, Indian Face, VidTIMIT,
LFW-a, 3D RMA, GavabDB, FRAV2D, FRAV3D, BJUT-3D, Bospho-
rus, PUT Face Database, BFM, Plastic Surgery, IFDB, Hong Kong
Polytechnic University NIR Face Database, PolyU-HDFD,MOBIO,
Texas 3DFRD, USTC-NVIE, FEI, ChokePoint, UMB database of 3D
occluded faces, VADANA, MORPH, LDHF-DB, PhotoFace,
EURECOM KFD, YouTube, YMU Dataset, VMU, MIW, 3dMAD,
Senthilkumar, McGill Real-world Face Video, SiblingDB, the
Adience image set and benchmark of unfiltered faces for age,
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gender, and subject classification, FaceScrub, LFW3D and
Adience 3D set, FG-NET, FRVT, FRGV, FRGC, BANCA, PubFig, and
the LFW dataset. Fig. 5 shows an example of a face database
in which 15 face images of the same PIE database user are pre-
sented. In this case, 15 camera views with frontal flash lighting
are presented. The most important facial databases that can
be downloaded via the Internet from public and private insti-
tutions are presented in Table 1. They were chosen based on
the information they can provide toward achieving ABC e-gate
recognition systems with the highest performance and effi-
ciency. A classification is shown in terms of the different
conditions under which the images in the facial databases, com-
prising either photo images or videos, were captured.
One of the most useful facial databases that can be used
to create highly accurate face recognition systems for use in
ABC applications is the CMU AMP Project Face In Action (FIA)
Face Video Database. Real-world applications can be simu-
lated using this database in which, for example, a person going
through the airport check-in point is recorded. Six different
cameras at three different angles were used to capture images
in different time periods and in indoor and outdoor sce-
narios. Facial images with different poses and expressions were
obtained and can be downloaded via the Internet. Greater se-
curity against presentation attacks is obtained using facial
databases with images taken at different wavelengths.Themost
common wavelengths used and reported in studies in the lit-
erature are inside the NIR–VIS spectrum.New features, textures,
and different ROC and efficiency values can be obtained with
the same facial database for each of the wavelengths em-
ployed. By introducing make-up and plastic surgery in facial
databases, a more realistic scenario can be obtained. In addi-
tion, when using 3D facial databases, by rotating the 3D facial
surface around the symmetry lines, additional information of
texture, depth, and pose correction is obtained (Blanz and Vetter,
1999, 2003; Godil et al., 2004). The 3D facial surface informa-
tion is invariant under both different lighting and pose
conditions. Databases that store facial images with changes
in the subjects appearance that occur over a period of time are
very important for ABC e-gate recognition. In these cases, age
progression should be considered by the comparison algo-
rithm. This algorithm can sometimes compare the passport
photo and/or the facial image with the image taken at the ABC
e-gate, moments before the passenger crosses the border.This
may occasionally affect the verification of certain travelers, al-
though only a very short period of time passed since the last
time they were enrolled.
4. Comparative analysis of different
automated border control systems
In this section, the different ABC systems identified as state
of the art are compared (Table 2). This analysis was per-
formed with respect to the real needs of the ABC systems,
remarking on the relevance of the systems according to their
different elements as used in ABC scenarios. Although not all
the studies presented in the tables refer to ABC systems, they
were chosen as addressing the most suitable systems for use
in an ABC scenario. In order to maintain the same criteria, an
evaluation of “high” is considered the best qualification in all
cases.As an example, the applicability of the system in Kosmerlj
et al. (2006) is high, meaning that the system proposed has a
high applicability for an ABC system. The aspects included in
the comparison are maturity, applicability, acceptance, perfor-
mance, cost, constraints, deployment, and over-all score.
Maturity refers to the level of plenitude presented by the tech-
nologies, both those being developed in research studies and
emerging technologies. Applicability is the measure of the suit-
ability of a certain technology for the ABC environment.
Acceptance refers to the users’ attitude to dealing with a spe-
cific technology. This factor depends on whether individuals
consider it an intrusive technique, in particular in the case of
Fig. 5 – Example of 15 camera views from the PIE database with frontal flash illumination.
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Table 1 – Classification of facial databases by conditions varied.
Different conditions of: Face image data base Face image videos
Illumination SCface, MultiPIE, the Yale Face, the Yale database B, AT&T (formerly
named the ORL database of faces), the NLPR Face, The University of Oulu
Physics-based Face Database, AT&T “The Database of Faces,” NLPR Face
Database; The AR Face Database, the Ohio State University, USA; The
University of Oulu Physics-based Face Database; CAS-PEAL Face
Database; The UCD Colour Face Image Database for Face Detection;
FRAV2D Database; Natural Visible and Infrared facial Expression
Database (USTC-NVIE); The EURECOM Kinect Face Dataset (EURECOM
KFD); YMU (YouTube Makeup) Dataset
McGill Real-world Face Video Database; Indian Movie
Face Database (IMFDB); BU-4DFE Database (Dynamic
Data)
Changes in a subject’s
appearance that occur
over a period of time (age
progression)
The Color FERET Database, USA; Georgia Tech Face Database; VADANA:
Vims Appearance Dataset for facial ANAlysis; MORPH Database
(Craniofacial Longitudinal Morphological Face Database)
Different wavelengths
(hyperspectral databases)
SCface – Surveillance Cameras Face Database; The University of Oulu
Physics-based Face Database; The Hong Kong Polytechnic University NIR
Face Database; The Hong Kong Polytechnic University Hyperspectral Face
Database (PolyU-HSFD); Natural Visible and Infrared facial Expression
Database (USTC-NVIE); Long Distance Heterogeneous Face Database
(LDHF-DB)
With landmarks SCfaceDB Landmarks; PUT Face Database; SiblingsDB Database BP4D-Spontanous Database
Different viewpoints MultiPIE, AT&T “The Database of Faces”; The MIT-CBCL face recognition,
NIST Mugshot; Identification Database; Georgia Tech Face Database; 3D-
RMA database;
VidTIMIT Database; McGill Real-world Face Video
Database; Indian Movie Face Database (IMFDB)
Occlusions: use of glasses,
scarf, beard, etc.
The Yale Face Database, AT&T “The Database of Faces,” Face Recognition
Data, University of Essex, UK, NLPR Face Database; The Bosphorus
Database; UMB database of 3D occluded faces; The EURECOM Kinect Face
Dataset (EURECOM KFD);
McGill Real-world Face Video Database; Indian Movie
Face Database (IMFDB); BP4D-Spontanous Database
Pose The Yale Face Database B, PIE Database of CMU,The MIT-CBCL face
recognition, CAS-PEAL Face Database; The UCD Colour Face Image
Database for Face Detection; FRAV2D Database; The Bosphorus Database;
UMB database of 3D occluded faces; The EURECOM Kinect Face Dataset
(EURECOM KFD); VMU (Virtual Makeup) Dataset
Project – Face In Action (FIA) Face Video Database,
AMP, CMU; McGill Real-world Face Video Database;
Indian Movie Face Database (IMFDB); BP4D-
Spontanous Database
Real world applications Labeled Faces in theWild; The LFWcrop Database; Labeled Faces in the
Wild-a (LFW-a); ChokePoint; PhotoFace: Face recognition using
photometric stereo
Project – Face In Action (FIA) Face Video Database,
AMP, CMU; YouTube Faces Database; McGill Real-
world Face Video Database; LFW3D and Adience3D
sets; BP4D-Spontanous Database
High resolution images The MIT-CBCL face recognition; PUT Face Database The Extended M2VTS Database, University of Surrey,
UK
3D model The MIT-CBCL face recognition; 3D-RMA Database; FRAV3D Database;
BJUT-3D Chinese Face Database; The Basel Face Model (BFM); Texas 3D
Face Recognition Database (Texas 3DFRD); UMB database of 3D occluded
faces; UMB database of 3D occluded faces; PhotoFace: Face recognition
using photometric stereo; BU-3DFE Database (Static Data)
The Extended M2VTS Database, University of Surrey,
UK; Denver Intensity of Spontaneous Facial Action
(DISFA) Database; BU-4DFE Database (Dynamic
Data); BP4D-Spontanous Database
Use of neural networks for
matching gray scale
Image Database of Facial Actions and Expressions – Expression Image
Database
People of various racial
origins
Face Recognition Data, University of Essex, UK; BU-3DFE Database (Static
Data)
Texas 3D Face Recognition Database (Texas 3DFRD)
Camera calibration The University of Oulu Physics-Based Face Database
Large scale CAS-PEAL Face Database; FaceScrub – A Dataset with Over 100,000 Face
Images of 530 People; LabeledWikipedia Faces (LWF)
YouTube Faces Database
Manually set eye and
fiducial points or
classification in sets
BioID Face DB – HumanScan AG, Switzerland; Psychological Image
Collection at Stirling (PICS)
Texas 3D Face Recognition Database (Texas 3DFRD)
Different quality The UCD Colour Face Image Database for Face Detection; 3D-RMA
database
Different scales and
rotations
Georgia Tech Face Database; The LFWcrop Database; FEI Face Database;
FaceScrub – A DatasetWith Over 100,000 Face Images of 530 People
Plastic surgery Plastic Surgery Face Database
Different ages The Iranian Face Database (IFDB); MORPH Database (Craniofacial
Longitudinal Morphological Face Database); The Adience image set and
benchmark of unfiltered faces for age, gender, and subject classification
McGill Real-world Face Video Database
Adding make-up VMU (Virtual Makeup) Dataset; YMU (YouTube Makeup) Dataset; MIW
(Makeup in the “Wild”) Dataset
Indian Movie Face Database (IMFDB)
Spoofing 3D Mask Attack Database (3DMAD) 3D Mask Attack Database (3DMAD)
Facial expressions The Yale Face Database PIE Database of CMU; AT&T “The Database of
Faces” (formerly “The ORL Database of Faces”); NLPR Face Database; The
AR Face Database, The Ohio State University, USA; CAS-PEAL Face
Database; Japanese Female Facial Expression (JAFFE) Database; the UCD
Color Face Image Database for Face Detection; Georgia Tech Face
Database; The Bosphorus Database; UMB database of 3D occluded faces;
The EURECOM Kinect Face Dataset (EURECOM KFD); VMU (Virtual
Makeup) Dataset; Senthilkumar Face Database (Version 1.0); 10k US Adult
Faces Database; BU-4DFE Database (Dynamic Data)
Project – Face In Action (FIA) Face Video Database,
AMP, CMU; Texas 3D Face Recognition Database
(Texas 3DFRD); McGill Real-world Face Video
Database; Indian Movie Face Database (IMFDB);
BP4D-Spontanous Database
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biometric technologies. In turn, it is necessary to take into con-
sideration social and cultural factors, according to which it may
be assumed that certain techniques are more or less ac-
cepted, according to the environment in which they are
introduced.The performance was measured in different terms
according to the nature of the technology. For example, for bio-
metric technologies, the performance also included efficiency.
This was defined in terms not only of the false positive rate,
but also of the process speed or rate in cases where this pa-
rameter is referred to. The costs refer to the technology
implementation andmaintenance. Constraints refer to the limi-
tations that affect the performance of the technologies, such
as difficulty in meeting the work load demands and prob-
lems of interoperability between systems. This aspect allows
measuring the technology used in the ABC systems.The evalu-
ation of deployment refers to the degree of difficulty of
implementing the technologies, depending on the type of tech-
nology used. Furthermore, an overall evaluation based on the
number of stars assigned to the technology presented in each
study is determined. It should be noted that the number of stars
is related to the score of the previous aspects (maturity, ap-
plicability, etc.). The more stars assigned, the more relevant is
the technology in each study, from our point of view. The
maximum score is 10 stars and the minimum 0 stars.This scale
was decided based on the comparison of the works pre-
sented in the tables. However, because the current use of
biometrics is not yet well accepted by end-users, the maximum
score of 10 stars was not given to any study. In Table 2, the
systems in the studies (Cantarero et al., 2013; Conde et al., 2011;
Kosmerlj et al., 2006; Kwon and Moon, 2008; Spreeuwers et al.,
2012; Frontex, 2010) are evaluated. It can be seen in this table
that the systems having the highest evaluation of all the them
are those described in Frontex (2010) and in Spreeuwers et al.
(2012), with eight stars. Frontex (2010) gives information about
RAPID and SmartGate ABC systems, which have already been
implemented in Portugal and Australia, respectively. Neither
system requires the prior registration of the traveler and they
are both interoperable. Face recognition in combination with
e-passports are used for travel document checking and bio-
metric verification is used for traveler identification. In these
cases, there is no control over the original registration of bio-
metric data. The systems are very well accepted and could be
integrated in other international airports. They were applied
in real situations and their applicability and performance are
high, although their maturity may not be sufficiently high to
allow their adaptation for use in other countries. In Spreeuwers
et al. (2012), an evaluation study was conducted in which au-
tomated facial recognition reliability for automatic border
passage in two ABC e-gates at Schiphol Airport was investi-
gated. The study consisted of a comparison of the live images
of every passenger and the digital photographs stored on their
passports. Again, the system is very well accepted and its high
performance, maturity, and applicability are key factors for the
good evaluation given by the authors. In Kosmerlj et al. (2006),
the use of the California State University (CSU) face identifi-
cation system 5.0 for identifying different face images of
subjects and for passport holders photo verification was de-
scribed.The study used different databases in order to estimate
the percentage of Norwegian people who have look-alikes in
the Norwegian population. For the verification performance,
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illumination and occlusions were controlled in order to simu-
late the best border controlled scenario. Although the
applicability and maturity of the technology are high, it has
several constraints, such as the appearance of the subjects hair,
that play an important role in its performance. From this study,
it is concluded that the face image verification is not suffi-
ciently secure to allow its implementation in ABC systems. For
this reason and despite the real scenario used, the system pre-
sented in Kosmerlj et al. (2006) scored six stars. The system
requires improvements in terms of security to allow its inte-
gration in ABC systems. In Kwon and Moon (2008), a face
identification system with cryptographic mechanisms based
on the current Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that is compat-
ible with ICAO’s Public Key Directory (PKD) was used for border
control applications.Although the system is enhanced in terms
of security as a result of the cryptographic mechanisms, its ap-
plicability at borders is low because the performance values
are not sufficiently high to be ICAO-compliant. Furthermore,
in the study, its physical design is not explained. Only the soft-
ware algorithms presented in the study could be implemented
in ABCs because of their similarity to other algorithms for ABCs
presented in literature. The efficiency of the system satisfies
ICAO recommendations; however, the study gives no informa-
tion of either FAR or FRR values and the database used was
not a database created for an ABC system scenario.The system
scored four stars because of this lack of information.The face
and fingerprint biometric recognition system used at Barajas
Airport in Spain was described in Cantarero et al. (2013). Bio-
metric data available in the electronic travel document and
more specifically in the second generation passport are needed
for correct verification. High applicability, maturity, and per-
formance levels characterize this ABC system.The system was
assigned seven stars. As mentioned in section 2, in Conde et al.
(2011) an evaluation of the results obtained for a face recog-
nition system in a real uncontrolled localization, such as Barajas
Airport, was presented. In the study, three video surveillance
cameras at different locations in the airport were selected for
capturing travelers’ images.Varying illumination changes and
quality levels, collaborative and non-collaborative subjects, and
different data compressions were considered. CSA gave the best
performance. For classification purposes, SVM was used. Al-
though the system is not sufficiently mature, its applicability
is high.A medium score is given to the other classifiers, mainly
because the cameras are not currently used for this purpose.
The system presented in this study was assigned five stars.
In this Table 2 the works (Bourlai et al., 2009; Kim, 2005; Kim
and Kim, 2008; Kumar et al., 2009; Karthikeyan et al., 2013) are
evaluated as well. That presented in Kim (2005) received the
best score. This study focused on using the passport codes to
search the traveler in an immigration database. Forged pass-
ports are detected by using automatic recognition of passport
codes and picture and face verification.When the traveler has
been located, his/her facial image is retrieved from the data-
base and verified with the photo in the passport. The main
problem of this study is the system’s low efficiency due to the
immigration database search engine that is not designed for
scalability. This database can be sizable and contain millions
of registered travelers (see Fig. 6). The system has a high per-
formance and applicability, the latter due to its relevance in
terms of spoofing; however, the other parameters are evalu-
ated asmedium or low,mostly because the system has not been
operated in a real environment and external conditions are not
considered in the study. In Bourlai et al., 2009, international
passports exhibiting a variety of facial image qualities and se-
Fig. 6 – Feature extraction and similarity measurements of a passport photo (left) and the face image retrieved from the
immigration database (right) (Kim, 2005).
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curity marks were used and the problem of matching high
resolution digital face images with low-resolution passport
photos scanned from the original document was addressed.
The study’s applicability to ABC systems is high because of the
relevance of international passports to these systems. The
systems performance does not satisfy ICAO requirements,
except when the system is trained with high resolution face
images.The other qualifications are medium and low because
the system was not operated in a real environment and high
resolution face images are not used in ABC systems. In Kim
and Kim (2008), passport recognition and face verification
methods were applied together with passport code recogni-
tion in order to discriminate forged passports in ABC systems.
In this system, the face is authenticated by measuring the simi-
larity between the feature vector of the passport facial image
and that in the database, which was constructed using PCA.
The applicability of the system in this study is high but its per-
formance is not ICAO-compliant.Acceptance of the systemwas
evaluated as medium, because the passengers passport must
be in very good condition. The deployment of the system was
considered medium, because the e-MRTD and the kiosk should
be prepared for this specific algorithm and should be well pro-
tected from external conditions.The system is not sufficiently
mature to be safe against spoofing attacks. The authors as-
signed five stars to the proposed system. In Kumar et al. (2009),
two novel methods for face verification with real-world images,
such as those in the “Labeled Faces in theWild” (LFW) dataset
and those from the PubFig dataset comprising images of public
figures acquired from the Internet, were presented. In the first
method, attribute classifiers and binary classifiers trained to
recognize different visual appearance aspects, such as gender,
race, and age, are used. In the second method, smile classifi-
ers are used, in which the similarity of faces or regions of faces
to specific reference people is learned. The system perfor-
mance is not ICAO-compliant, but was very high for the
complex sample population studied. Although the database
used is very similar to those employed in ABC systems because
several factors, such as illumination, pose, occlusions, and ex-
pressions, are considered, only the software part, and neither
its physical appearance nor hardware components, are de-
scribed in the paper. Because of this lack of information, the
aspects of applicability, acceptance, and deployment were evalu-
ated as medium and the overall score assigned is four stars.
In Karthikeyan et al. (2013), a face verification system operat-
ing with the FRGC dataset, which comprises 3D scans and high
resolution still images taken under controlled and uncon-
trolled conditions, was presented.Although the authors assured
that the performance is high, no value was provided.The char-
acteristics of the system described in this study are that 3D
scanned images and integral normalized gradient images are
used in the pre-processing stage for avoiding image noise and
the halo effect, which could be useful in ABC systems. However,
as in Kumar et al. (2009), only the software algorithms are ap-
plicable to ABCs because the hardware used was not described.
Furthermore, the evaluation of the applicability of the system
is lower than that of the system in Kumar et al. (2009), because
3D scanners are not used in current ABC systems. The works
(Beom-seok and Kar-ann, 2013; Hwang et al., 2011; Li et al., 2013;
Manjupriya et al., 2013; Zafeiriou et al., 2013) and the general
situation of current ABC systems are evaluated in this table
as well. The system presented in the study in Hwang et al.
(2011), briefly described previously, in which a face recogni-
tion framework based on the ECG classifier bunchwas proposed,
is evaluated as the best of them. The bunch is made of plural
ECG classifiers combined by means of a log-likelihood ratio-
based score fusion scheme.The evaluation was performed using
the FRGC database with two experimental protocols, called EXP1
and EXP4.The first protocol was designed to measure the per-
formance of traditional frontal face recognition systems under
controlled illumination conditions and the second contains un-
expected illumination changes, blurred images, and some
occlusions in images.The ROC curves were calculated and the
performance values obtained with EXP1 classifiers were such
that the system satisfies the ICAO performance recommen-
dations. The system is considered by the authors sufficiently
mature to be installed in ABC systems. Its performance and
applicability are also high, because of its robustness against
illumination, occlusions, and low quality images. The hard-
ware components required in order to integrate the algorithms
in ABC systems are not described in the study. The final score
assigned to the system by the authors is six stars. In Manjupriya
et al. (2013), a face verification system that is very robust to
changes in illumination was proposed. In the study, theYale-B
database was used. For image normalization, integral normal-
ized gradient image including the Retinex method was
employed, KPCA was used for feature extraction, and the Score
Fusion-based Weighted Sum Method was used for achieving
the scores. This paper is relevant to ABCs only because of the
systems invariance to illumination variation. A final evalua-
tion score of four stars is assigned by the authors to the system
presented in this study. In Beom-seok and Kar-ann (2013), a
face verification system, previously mentioned in Section 2,
which uses sinusoidal projection for feature extraction with
the AR, ORL, and BERC databases, was proposed. The applica-
bility of this system toABC systems is provided by its invariance
to external and intrinsic factors, because the databases used
in the study contain images captured with varying illumina-
tion, time, expressions, poses, and occlusions.The verification
results were compared with those of other methods, such as
H2DPCA, V2DPCA, and structured projections. A higher per-
formance was obtained with sinusoidal projection, although
the values recommended by ICAO for use in ABCs were not ob-
tained. The system presented in this study was assigned four
stars, because neither the hardware components nor their dis-
tribution and system physical appearance were described in
the paper.The authors of Li et al. (2013) addressed the problem
of pose variant face verification in uncontrolled settings using
a probabilistic elastic matching method with the LFW and the
YouTube video face databases. In their system, in order to
improve feature localization, a Gaussian mixture model (GMM)
is trained to capture the spatial appearance distribution of all
face images. Each Gaussian component builds the correspon-
dence of a pair of features to be matched with two faces/face
tracks. For face verification, an SVM is used to decide whether
a pair of faces/face tracks matches or not. Furthermore, a joint
Bayesian adaptation algorithm was proposed to adapt the uni-
versally trained GMM to better model the pose variations in
each pair of faces. Although the performance of the system
does not meet ICAO requirements, it was considerably im-
proved by using this procedure. The main contribution of this
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study to an ABC system is the systems robustness against dif-
ferent poses as a result of the algorithms used. However,
although a considerable amount of information is given about
the state of the art of face recognition, information about neither
the physical design and hardware processing nor the setup com-
ponents distribution of the system is provided. Furthermore,
this study was not conducted in a real ABC scenario. The
authors assigned a score of four stars to the system pre-
sented in this study. In Zafeiriou et al. (2013), a verification
system device in which the presence of a subject is automati-
cally detected using an ultrasound technique was located at
the entrance to a busy workplace, capturing 1839 face images
with natural poses and expressions. The Photoface database
was used, being suitable for both 2D and 3D face recognition
based on photometric stereo (PS). The highly realistic data ob-
tained and the different reconstruction and recognition
methods, using the albedo, surface normals, and recovered
depthmaps,make this systems implementation inABC systems
very valuable. Although the system deployment is not evalu-
ated as high because of the complexity of the stereo system,
there is less interaction of the system with the passenger, and
therefore, the acceptance of the system will not be poor and
it will suffer very few physical constraints. As soon as this
system is implemented in ABC systems, more devices will be
fabricated with great success and therefore the costs will be
reduced. Furthermore, by using these stereo photos, security
in ABC systems will be increased. In addition, the scenario used
in the study was far from that of ABC systems. The overall
evaluation score is five stars. To conclude, a general evalua-
tion of the current ABC systems was presented. Although in
our opinion the end-user perception of these systems is very
good, people are becoming more familiar with biometric in-
formation collection, and the systems are now more user
friendly, problems related to general acceptance remain. In ad-
dition, the costs of the ABC systems were average and some
effort should be invested in decreasing them. Furthermore, facial
identification algorithms have improved significantly during
the last few years, in particular for use in ABC systems, mainly
because of the controlled conditions under which they operate.
This explains why experts in biometrics technology have begun
to believe in facial biometrics as the only modality to be used
in future ABC systems, instead of fingerprints or other mo-
dalities.An important characteristic that an ABC system should
have is interoperability, so that it can be interoperable in any
location, that is, interoperable with those of other national air-
ports and also with the ABC systems of other countries.
5. Experimental evaluation
In order to reproduce an automatic border control (ABC) e-gate
scenario and implement an ABC e-gate face recognition system
with high performance and efficiency, an experimental setup
with a design very similar to that of the system used at Barajas
Airport using halogen lights, white light-emitting diodes (LEDs),
near-infrared (NIR) illumination, and fluorescent illumina-
tion was designed. The main aim of this experiment was to
evaluate the influence of different illuminations on the ABC
systems performance. An evaluation of the system was per-
formed, as well as a comparison with other ABC systems
presented in the literature, using the classical standards for
evaluating biometrics: efficiency and accuracy. Efficiency was
considered to be a measurement of resources used in rela-
tion to the systems accuracy and completeness; it can be
measured by evaluating the time spent during the whole
process or during different steps of it. Accuracy was deter-
mined by evaluating error indexes, usually in the case of
biometric systems the false rejection rate (FRR) and the false
acceptance rate (FAR), and their graphical representation in a
receiving characteristic operating (ROC) curve. Furthermore, the
system presented is a highly reliable ABC system. In the context
of biometrics, reliability tends to be associated with the systems
performance in terms of accuracy. It is used to determine how
the biometric system performs its matching function (mea-
suring and evaluating system performance through e.g., FAR
and FRR). More importantly, it indicates how different perfor-
mance rates and their alteration affect the overall security of
the border check process.
5.1. System description
ABC systems used in airports have very similar characteris-
tics.Typical elements that constitute anABC system are cameras
to capture images, a fingerprint reader, a reader for machine-
readable travel documents (e-MRTD), an illumination system
to avoid external light variations, usually a video screen with
images or videos to give instructions for system use, and fast
and highly efficient recognition software for traveler verifica-
tion and identification. In this study, the experimental setup
was very similar to the system used at Barajas Airport (see
Fig. 7).
5.1.1. Hardware
Following Frontex best practice guidelines, and with the purpose
of capturing high quality facial images, halogen, white LED, NIR,
and homogeneous fluorescent illumination were used in the
setup.Three Logitech QuickCam SphereAF cameras were placed
in a static configuration covering a complete range of human
heights (175 cm, 160 cm, and 145 cm, respectively).The cameras
have two megapixel sensors and can capture images with an
improved resolution of 8 megapixels using the correct illumi-
nation. When there are no moving objects, as in this setup,
hardware is less prone to failure. Illumination is a key aspect
in facial verification, and therefore, was carefully considered.
Two illumination sections were placed to the right and left of
the cameras. Two diffusers blocked direct light and gener-
ated ambient illumination. Diffusers minimize reflections and
distribute illumination almost homogeneously. This configu-
ration allowed several changes in the illumination to be studied.
In our experiments, several light conditions were taken into
account: LED illumination, and fluorescent and halogen bulbs.
In an additional experiment, near-infrared (NIR) illuminators
were used. The LED illumination configuration consisted of 6
LED bulbs in each illumination section, for a total of 12 LED
bulbs. Each LED bulb featured 48 LED diodes with a white light
emission of 280 lumens.The bulbs were protected by white dif-
fusers that made illumination more homogenous for both sides
of the user’s face.The illumination section was directed toward
the user at an angle of 45 degrees.The main difference between
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the studied prototype and a real application is that the tested
system included neither a travel document reader nor a vali-
dation subsystem.These subsystemswere not required for these
tests, as the facial samples for comparison were obtained from
an external image database.
5.1.2. Software
The recognition and verification software used in this study
was a commercial product. An application interface (API) was
developed based on libraries provided by the owner of the
product, although the recognition algorithms used were not
shown.The recognition process was split into two main steps.
First, an image was acquired and preprocessed. It was dis-
carded if it was considered of low quality (no face was detected,
the face was too small, etc.); otherwise, it was compared with
the identity photo.The recognition algorithm used was a com-
mercial one suitable for use in ABC systems.This initial process
was repeated with several live images for each subject. The
result of the comparison was a score that was stored. Finally,
the highest score from the set of stored scores was set as the
final score. If the final score was sufficiently high, the subject
was allowed to continue.
5.1.3. Database
One hundred and thirty-four volunteers participated in con-
structing the datasets. The reference dataset contained the
images used as a reference or template to verify the subjects
identities (see Fig. 8). The images were newly acquired live ref-
erence images, of high quality, captured with a reflex camera,
printed using a photographic printer and paper, scanned using
a flatbed scanner, and finally post-processed according to ICAO
standards. The test dataset contained four classes of illumi-
nation: LED, halogen, fluorescent, and NIR (see Fig. 9). These
four illuminations were tested in order to know which of them
could provide better face recognition results in ABC systems.
Images were acquired over the course of several days to allow
for variations in make up, beard growth, clothes, and natural
illumination. The mean time span between image acquisi-
tions was seven days. The setup was an indoor environment.
In the acquisition of the database, no disturbing light from other
sources was allowed in the setup of the ABC e-gate. The ex-
periment (Fig. 7) introduced a more realistic variability, since
each day one type of illumination was used. Subjects were re-
quested to remain in front of the system for at least 6.5 s. During
Fig. 7 – Experimental evaluation setup. The circles in front
of the subject are the cameras that capture the face images,
and those to the side (left and right) are the light emitters.
Explanatory video screens, the fingerprint reader, and the
e-MRTD are below the cameras.
Fig. 8 – Reference (left) and test image (right) using LED
illumination of the same subject from the database.
Fig. 9 – Test images of a subject in the database.
Illuminations considered, from left to right, and top to
bottom: LED, halogen, fluorescent, and near-infrared.
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this time, one image was acquired every 180 ms.The minimum
number of images captured per subject was 30 and the
maximumwas 34.Themean number of images per subject was
32.61 (with a standard deviation of 1.49). The image size was
960 × 720 pixels for a color image with 24 bits per pixel. Each
image was compressed in JPEG, and the mean final size was
64 kB.
5.2. Results and discussion
The first measurement used to evaluate the ABC system is
based on the system accuracy, as it was previously defined.
In this paper, the biometric system evaluation approach con-
sidered was the FAR and the FRR. The point at which both
errors are equal is called the equal error rate (EER). In the
work presented the EER is used as the accuracy measure-
ment of the ABC system. Every test image was compared with
all the acquired reference images in a cross-validation manner.
In this experiment, the reference or template image was the
high quality image acquired following the protocol of pass-
port image acquisition. Reference images were recently
captured, and the same acquisition protocol, acquisition device,
and scenario were applied for all subjects. An example of the
test and reference images is presented in Fig. 8. As in real
ABC systems, subjects wearing glasses were asked to remove
them during the verification step. In the first experiment, one
hundred and forty-four subjects were used with all the illu-
minations under consideration. In order to analyze only the
influence of illumination, a time variation between the test
and reference images greater than three weeks was not allowed.
Results are presented in an ROC curve, which is frequently
used in the biometrics community (FAR vs FRR). In Fig. 10,
the system performance for each illumination is presented.
It can be seen that the best results (i.e., the lowest EER) are
obtained from halogen illumination, with an EER of 0.42%.
The EER for LED and fluorescent illumination were 0.79% and
1.03%, respectively. In the case of NIR illumination, the error
increases to 5.70%.The FRR rates at FAR 0.1% were 3.4%, 0.8%,
0.8%, and 26.3%, for fluorescent, halogen, LED, and NIR illu-
mination, respectively, satisfying the best practical technical
guidelines for ABC systems (FAR = 0.1%, FRR ≤ 5%) (Frontex,
2012a), except from the NIR illumination. Thus, the influence
of illumination is relevant, since the EER of the best illumina-
tion condition (halogen) is nearly twice that of the second
best (LED) and nearly three times that of the third best (fluo-
rescent). NIR presents an EER approximately 13 times higher
than does halogen. Notice that even the best results imply a
poor performance as compared to the results of state-of-the-
art studies.The main differences between the results presented
in state-of-the-art studies and the results presented in this
paper are due to the fact that the proposed setup was in-
tended to be realistic. That is, it is not reasonable to compare
our results with those of studies in the literature, since in
general no results for a real system are presented in those
studies. It can be concluded that the illumination applied in
the ABC prototype was very relevant and greatly affected the
final results. Efficiency was also considered as a second mea-
surement to evaluate the system. The approach that was
followed for measuring the execution time between different
points of the ABC process was similar to the work developed
in the FastPass project (FastPass, 2016). The verification time
was less than 1 s for each subject when the face image was
considered to be of good quality for subsequent processing.
This calculation was performed based on the time informa-
tion given by the software developer.The efficiency value, which
comprised the time between the image being captured by the
cameras and correct user verification, was about 2 s.This value
was measured using an API that we developed that mea-
sures the photo capture time, as well as the identity verification
efficiency given by the program that was a characteristic of
the algorithm used and that was not given by the vendor.
The evaluation was done using a PC Intel Core i5-2400, 3.10
GHz with 8 GB RAM. These results satisfy the best practical
technical guidelines for the efficiency of ABC systems (Frontex,
2012a). In addition, the total efficiency of the system located
at Barajas Airport, which uses a one-step mantrap, was cal-
culated, although in that case document checks and a
fingerprint reader were also used. The total efficiency con-
sisted of the time measured between the point when the
traveler placed his or her passport on the e-MRTD and the
point when the traveler crossed the ABC e-gate, which was
10 s on average.This value was calculated as the average time
for 100 people and is in agreement with Frontex recom-
mended efficiency (Frontex, 2012a). The direct quantitative
comparison between these results and other in-field results
of different ABC gates is not simple. Because of security reasons,
there are very few published results and the databases used
to obtain these results or the measurements used in evalua-
tion are generally not thoroughly explained. It should be noted
that currently, the formal evaluation framework for ABC systems
is not yet completely defined. Considering these strong re-
strictions, we present a comparison of these results with the
work described in Oostveen et al. (2014), which is one of several
studies carried out as part of the FastPass project and is based
on ABC systems. In this paper, one hundred and twenty-five
face-to-face surveys with passengers describing their experi-
ences with ABC biometric systems are shown. Two different
approaches, such as the two-step mantrap design and the one-
step mantrap design, were considered. Problems like passport
scanning and facial recognition were the cause of delays in
the entrances. Regarding the former, 58% of passengers had
problems with the passport scanner and 20% were not able
to solve their problems by themselves, so that a manual check
by a border officer was required. Regarding the latter, 13% of
passengers experienced problems. In the two-step mantrap
design, many live images showed people looking down at the
passport scanner, causing a high delay in access time. In fact,
on several occasions, a manual check was required and time-
out was reached. This problem could only be solved if the
length of time to reach a time-out were increased. In this paper,
efficiency results are the following: when the e-gates work
and the passengers know exactly what to do, the system is
fast, taking about 15–20 s to let a passenger through. This is
slightly higher than our measurements, in which only 10 s
was needed. However, when people have problems under-
standing the system, this paper reports that access time can
be as long as 5 minutes. In our case, this situation was not
observed. Regarding facial recognition, it takes a border guard
10 s to process a person, the same as in our measurements.
Considering ABC system accuracy, some public results of dif-
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ferent ABC approaches are reported in the literature, such as
in the Frontex workshop, “1st Global Conference and Exhibi-
tion on Future developments on Automated Border Control,”
held inWarsaw in 2012 (Frontex, 2012b). Following the line of
other meetings, in this workshop the Spanish National Police
presented several ABC accuracy results, although the exact
location of the ABC system evaluated was not named. In ad-
dition, they referred only to FRR values because only bona-
fide users were considered; consequently it was not possible
to measure the FAR. The FRR of the facial recognition algo-
rithm was 11.99%, and when a multi-biometric algorithm was
used (facial + fingerprint recognition), the FRR value de-
creased to 1.40%. It should be noted that the multi-biometric
approach can only be applied to Spanish users. In other cases,
fingerprint information is not accessible. No details about the
database used were given and only an average of 50,000 pas-
sengers per month was mentioned. Other ABC performance
data available were presented in 2013 at the Frontex “2nd Global
Conference and Exhibition on Future developments on Auto-
mated Border Control,” held in Warsaw and organized by the
Immigration and Border Service of Portugal (Frontex, 2013).
In this case, the evaluation details were more specific, pre-
senting a database of 125,933 pairs of photos at Lisbon Airport,
only considering facial information. An FRR of 6.32% at a mea-
sured FAR of 0.046% was shown. Finally, other ABC performance
values can be found in the different documents written for
the FastPass project, such as in Opitz and Kriechbaum-Zabini.
In this work, two commercial facial verification systems were
Fig. 10 – ROC curve results for the different illumination test datasets and acquired reference image dataset. From left to
right, and top to bottom: fluorescent, halogen, LED, and near-infrared illumination.
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applied to a database of 3224 sessions acquired at Schipol
airport (Amsterdam), considering only facial information.
System A presented an FRR of 0.9% at an FAR fixed at 0.1%
and system B presented an FRR of 2% at an FAR fixed at 0.1%.
6. Improvements in face recognition systems
in automated border control e-gates
In this section, some of the possible future improvements in
ABC e-gates face recognition systems are described. Most of
these are based on acquiring high quality images so that
high-level efficiency and performance can be achieved. Re-
searchers working on advanced recognition models are
continuously searching a universal invariance to non-
idealities so that systems are not affected by subjects wearing
glasses or changes in rotation, translation, pose, expression,
lighting (Martinez, 2002; Zhang and Gao, 2009; Zou et al.,
2007), etc. The identification of individuals appearing in more
than one camera, simultaneous verification and identifica-
tion of various people in an e-gate, and the elaboration of
novel algorithms able to recognize young children and im-
paired travelers are important goals. Individuals in a group
of faces can be detected, using, for example, the Viola Jones
algorithm and Fisherface and eigenface algorithms. These
algorithms are frequently employed for this purpose, in
particular when a high level of invariant external param-
eters, such as lighting, is desired (Belhumeur et al., 1997).
Interfaces using video-based approaches that can track trav-
elers when they are entering a gate could be used for many
applications, such as monitoring the traveler’s behavior, cap-
turing several face gestures and expressions, detecting or
interpreting liveness motion, determining the patterns of an
individual’s movement, estimating crowd densities, measur-
ing line lengths, and/or issuing alerts about abandoned baggage.
The use of mobile cameras at ABC e-gates for intelligent
video surveillance purposes in order to obtain relevant infor-
mation about the scene in an e-gate will be introduced in the
near future. This can be also used for remotely informing the
guards about the situation occurring in a scene. The math-
ematical algorithms for detecting moving objects in an image
and filtering non-relevant movements will be improved. The
attributes of all the objects detected and their movement
properties will be recorded in databases. Events of interest
will be searched in these databases and decisions will be
reached by the system according to the relevance of these
events. Security at the borders will be reinforced by video
analytic techniques. These techniques can result in real-time
or non-real-time alerts, leading to video searches to investi-
gate the event at the pixel and object level. The different
tasks to be performed by these techniques, such as change
detection, segmentation, monitoring, and classification of
humans according to knowledge about their activities and
behaviors, will be developed. ABC system performance will
be improved with the integration of specialized software in
the ABC e-gates to infer the attributes of travelers, such as
gender and age. Multispectral image capture (Chen et al.,
2003; Pan et al., 2003) will be used to capture 3D face images
and detect features.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, an introduction to the ABC e-gates that are cur-
rently operational in most of the airports worldwide,
e-passports, face databases, and the various EU projects focused
onABC systems was presented. Non-idealities, such as changes
in illumination, temperature, humidity, pose, position, trans-
lation, and rotation, should be considered in the design of ABC
e-gates. A review was presented of some of the algorithms re-
ported in the literature that are used in face recognition systems
and are invariant to these non-idealities and can therefore be
implemented in ABC systems. A comparison of the different
ABC systems that can be found in many ABC Schengen area
airports and that were reported in the literature and face rec-
ognition systems with characteristics that are highly compatible
with an ABC scenario, in terms of maturity, applicability, ac-
ceptance, performance, costs, constraints, and deployment, was
presented. To conclude, an experimental evaluation of a face
recognition system having a design very similar to that used
in the Barajas Airport ABC system, under halogen, white LEDs,
NIR, and fluorescence illumination, was presented.A test using
a 144-subject database showed that halogen illumination is su-
perior to all the other different illumination configurations
analyzed, closely followed by LED illumination, which can be
more suitable in real operation conditions because of power
consumption, dissipated heat, and user convenience. Given that
there are no relevant differences between the real system and
the proposed prototype, the presented results could be gen-
eralized to the real case. Further work will include the
acquisition of a larger database of real passport images to allow
more relevant tests. Future improvements in face recogni-
tion systems for ABC e-gates were discussed.
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